University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 85

Issue 1

Article 1

August 2018

The Logic of Comparable-Case Guidance in the Determination of
Awards for Pain and Suffering and Punitive Damages
Hillel J. Bavli

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr

Recommended Citation
Hillel J. Bavli, The Logic of Comparable-Case Guidance in the Determination of Awards for Pain and
Suffering and Punitive Damages, 85 U. Cin. L. Rev. (2018)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol85/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact
ronald.jones@uc.edu.

Bavli: Logic of Comparable-Case Guidance

THE LOGIC OF COMPARABLE-CASE GUIDANCE IN THE
DETERMINATION OF AWARDS FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING AND
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Hillel J. Bavli*

Abstract
Little guidance is provided to triers of fact in arriving at awards for
pain and suffering and punitive damages. Such awards are therefore
highly variable.
This article explains why methods involving
comparable-case guidance—information regarding awards in
comparable cases as guidance for determining damage awards—are
effective not only in reducing unpredictability, but also in improving the
accuracy of awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages
generally. The article addresses major objections to such methods, and
provides relevant legal context and direction for implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawmakers and scholars have struggled to address the
unpredictability of awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages.
Jurors are provided with very little guidance in determining such
awards, and courts lack objective standards to guide jurors and review
their awards. Consequently, awards can vary wildly.
For example, in a well-known case involving allegations that the auto
manufacturer BMW had fraudulently failed to disclose to a purchaser
that his newly purchased car had been repainted after suffering damage,
a jury awarded the purchaser compensatory damages of $4,000 and
punitive damages of $4 million. 1 However, in an identical case brought
by another purchaser in the same court and before the same judge, but
with a different jury, the jury awarded a similar level of compensatory
damages, but no punitive damages at all, finding that BMW’s behavior
did not rise to the level of reprehensibility deserving of punitive
damages. 2
The awards in the BMW case, like others—such as a medical
* Harvard University. The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and not those
of any organization with which he is affiliated. The author thanks Donald Rubin, David Rosenberg,
Joseph Blitzstein, Kenneth Shepsle, and Yang Chen for their helpful comments, and John Kenneth
Felter for his helpful edits.
1. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The Alabama Supreme Court
reduced the award to $2 million, and the United States Supreme Court ultimately reversed, holding that
even $2 million in punitive damages was grossly excessive. Id. at 585–86.
2. See George L. Priest, Introduction to CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW
JURIES DECIDE 2-3 (2002).
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malpractice case resulting in a pain and suffering award of $100 million 3
or a deceptive-cigarette-marketing case resulting in a punitive damages
award of $28 billion 4—represent a stark deviation from Justice
Holmes’s characterization of the law as a “systematized prediction.”5
As Judge Niemeyer commented regarding the $100 million award in
Evans v. St. Mary’s Hospital of Brooklyn, “Because the jury was given
no rule nor any rational criteria to apply in setting the amount of such an
award, but told simply to do what it thought best, the jury responded
with a perceived ‘measurement’ of the pain, which essentially amounted
to an emotional response.” 6 The jury award in Evans—an award ten
times the amount requested by the plaintiff’s attorney, and one that the
trial judge ultimately reduced to $3.5 million—suggests, at least, that
such awards are unpredictable.7 Regarding the award in Bullock v.
Philip Morris, Inc., Judge Niemeyer commented that “only emotion, not
a rule of law, could justify imposing an award of $28 billion. To
confirm this, one need only consider the ‘mind’ of a legislative body
developing a prospective rule of law to punish similar conduct.” 8
Indeed, numerous empirical studies have confirmed substantial
anecdotal evidence that awards for pain and suffering and punitive
damages are highly unpredictable. 9
3. See Evans v. St. Mary’s Hosp. of Brooklyn, 1 A.D.3d 314 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
4. See Bullock v. Philip Morris Inc., No. BC249171, 2002 WL 31833905 (Cal. App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002).
5. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897). Justice
Holmes observed that “[p]eople want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the
risk of coming against what is so much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to
find out when this danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of
the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.” Id. at 457; see also Paul v.
Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of our Tort System, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1401, 1402–04 (2004).
6. Niemeyer, supra note 5, at 1403.
7. Id. at 1403–04.
8. Id. at 1409–10 (noting that the “California legislature has fixed the maximum fine for false
advertising at $2500,” and that “Congress has fixed the maximum fine for corporations’ violations of
federal offenses at $500,000 or twice the defendant’s gain or the victim’s loss”).
9. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources
of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 317 (1998) (concluding that
there is “considerable variation in both juror and jury awards,” and that “[a] substantial portion of that
variation is not predictable from measures of either background or attitudinal individual differences
across jurors”); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and
Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 919–24 (1989) (concluding that “[a]lthough the median, and even
mean, awards in a given category may be considered relatively reasonable, the seemingly uncontrolled
variability of awards is cause for concern—similar to anxiety about drowning in a pool averaging only
two feet in depth”); Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 768–69 (1995) (citing studies); David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages
For Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 259 (1989) (concluding that “tort awards
for even this relatively simple area [of damages for pain and suffering prior to death] vary significantly
and that neither the specific facts of the case nor differing theoretical views of the functions of the
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Commentators have proposed numerous methods to address
unpredictability, including various forms of award schedules that bind or
guide a jury in its award determination in light of its findings regarding
certain facts, such as the severity of a plaintiff’s injuries. 10 Thus,
“[s]chedules with categories based on injury severity typically provide
the method of classification, and prior awards for injuries within each
category provide a range of damages amounts.” 11 That is, “[a]lthough
reforms of this type differ in their details, each proceeds from the
premise that prior pain-and-suffering awards for similar cases provide
the appropriate basis for computing the present award.” 12 Ultimately,
“[t]he jury or reviewing court determines where the plaintiff ’s injury
falls on the schedule, and the schedule provides a range or specified
amount that can be binding or nonbinding on juries or courts.” 13
To the extent that these methods predetermine the award or range of
awards, and to the extent that they bind the jury rather than guide it, they
have been criticized as “eviscerat[ing] the various contributions that
juries make to the civil justice system,” and as being “inconsistent with
the basic tort principle that each victim is entitled to an award tailored to
his or her circumstances, set by a lay jury.” 14
A similar recommendation, proposed previously in various forms,
involves “comparability analysis.” Using this approach, the court
(perhaps by way of an adversarial process involving the litigation
parties, and even the trier of fact) would first identify a universe of
comparable cases. It would then provide the trier of fact with certain
information regarding the awards in these cases in the context of a jury
instruction or as expert testimony, and it would instruct the trier of fact
to arrive at a damages determination in light of the evidence introduced
in the case, using the comparable-case information (or “prior-award
information”) as guidance. 15 Such methods are based, in part, on

awards can explain such variation”); see also Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent,
Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (but Otherwise A Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV.
253, 291–303 (2006). But see Yun-chien Chang et al., Pain and Suffering Damages in Personal Injury
Cases: An Empirical Study (Univ. of Chicago Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No.
749, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2741180 (concluding that “pain and suffering damages in
Taiwan are to a large extent statistically and legally predictable”).
10. See infra Part III.
11. Mark Geistfeld, Placing A Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries
Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 791 (1995).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. David A. Logan, Juries, Judges, and the Politics of Tort Reform, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 903,
942–43 (2015).
15. See infra Part III. Note that there is substantial overlap between such methods and those
involving scheduling—particularly to the extent that scheduling methodologies involve providing a trier
of fact with scenarios and associated award values, based on comparable cases, as guidance in
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empirical studies confirming that they are effective in controlling
outlying awards and reducing award variability generally, even using
prior awards to guide, rather than bind, the trier of fact. 16
For purposes of clarity—because the terms “damage schedule” and
“comparability analysis” have been used in the literature to mean
various things in various contexts—I will use the term “comparable-case
guidance” (CCG) to refer to scheduling or comparability-analysis
methods that fulfill three fundamental requirements: 1) information used
as guidance must be derived from prior “comparable” cases (as
opposed to, e.g., damage schedules predetermined arbitrarily by a
legislative body); 2) comparable-case information must be considered
by the trier of fact in particular (as opposed to, e.g., a reviewing court);
and 3) comparable-case information must be used as guidance only (as
opposed to, e.g., imposing a range or amount that is binding on the trier
of fact). 17
While CCG methods allow for a case-by-case analysis that remains in
the discretion of the trier of fact, the use of prior awards itself has been
attacked based on three fundamental objections. First, “[i]f the system
has been providing overly arbitrary pain-and-suffering awards, and if we
have no method for determining the appropriate award in the first
instance, why should we make prior awards the cornerstone of future
awards,” since “[b]y doing so, we may ensure that like cases are treated
alike in that all involve inappropriate damages awards.” 18 Second, such
methods “fail to address the fundamental issue of how one should
initially assess the value of pain-and-suffering damages” or arrive at an
appropriate punitive damages award. 19 Third, the validity of such
determining damages. See also Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21
LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 243, 246 (1997); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9, at 953.
16. See, e.g., Saks et al., supra note 15, at 249–55.
17. Note that the analysis herein may apply to scheduling and comparability analysis more
broadly; however, I focus on CCG methods in particular.
18. Geistfeld, supra note 11, at 792 (commenting that “[t]his reliance upon past awards . . .
represents the most problematic aspect of these reform proposals”); see Peter H. Schuck, Scheduled
Damages and Insurance Contracts for Future Services: A Comment on Blumstein, Bovbjerg, and Sloan,
8 YALE J. ON REG. 213, 218 (1991) (“by using earlier awards as the foundation for their new system of
damages scheduling, they impound and then compound what they themselves characterize as the
distortions of the past, thereby projecting those distortions into the future”); see also Robert L. Rabin,
The Pervasive Role of Uncertainty in Tort Law: Rights and Remedies, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 448–49
(2011) (“Scheduling proposals of this kind have been criticized by torts scholars such as Mark Geistfeld,
who pointed out the seeming paradox in rejecting unstructured jury decision making in favor of a
scheduled approach, which from a horizontal equity perspective takes arbitrary prior awards as the
cornerstone for future awards, and from a vertical equity perspective takes the ordering of magnitude in
past jury awards as an appropriate key for hierarchical sorting in the designated severity-categories for
future awards.”).
19. Ronen Avraham, Putting A Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the Current
Approaches and A Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 87, 104 (2006) (discussing
pain and suffering awards in particular, and citing W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering: Damages in
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methods relies heavily on the presumption that a “correct” set of cases
has been identified—that the prior cases identified are indeed materially
comparable to the case at hand. 20
These objections boil down to a fundamental concern: if our problem
is the unpredictability of awards caused by a trier of fact’s inability to
assess objectively the appropriate value of awards for pain and suffering
or punitive damages, how is it beneficial to provide a trier of fact with
information regarding damages awarded in prior cases that are separate
and distinct from the present case and that presumably suffer from the
same arbitrariness that we wish to address in the present case?
Seemingly, this would only compound the problem.
My aim in this article is to address these objections by explaining in
simple but formal terms how, notwithstanding the foregoing objections,
CCG methods not only reduce unpredictability but improve the accuracy
of awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages generally by
allowing for the sharing of relevant information across cases.
Part II discusses the importance of reducing the variability of awards
for pain and suffering and punitive damages. Part III provides
background regarding current methods and proposals for reducing award
variability. Part IV explains how CCG methods reduce unpredictability
and improve the accuracy of awards for pain and suffering and punitive
damages generally. Part V discusses a number of considerations for
identifying a universe of prior cases and for distilling information from
such cases for consideration by the trier of fact. Part VI provides
additional legal context for CCG methods and concludes.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF REDUCING THE VARIABILITY OF AWARDS FOR
PAIN AND SUFFERING AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of
maintaining fair and consistent awards for pain and suffering and
punitive damages. In a recent case, for example, the Court stated:
The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive
awards. Courts of law are concerned with fairness as consistency,
and evidence that the median ratio of punitive to compensatory
Search of A Sounder Rationale, 1 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 141, 168 (1996) (“The key issue to be
resolve[d] for pain and suffering schedules and scales is that establishing such arbitrary benchmarks
does not resolve the more fundamental issue of how one should initially assess the value of pain and
suffering damages.”)).
20. See Logan, supra note 14, at 943–44 (“While [an approach allowing the fact finder to
consider a range of possible awards for guidance] would improve predictability, such an approach would
only be as good as the quality of the methodology for selecting which cases were factually similar
enough to be included in the range.”).
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awards falls within a reasonable zone, or that punitive awards are
infrequent, fails to tell us whether the spread between high and low
individual awards is acceptable. The available data suggest it is
not. 21
The Supreme Court continued by discussing the “inherent uncertainty
of the trial process” and the resulting inconsistency among awards in
cases with similar facts. 22 In examining unpredictability as a matter of
policy, rather than of constitutional significance, 23 the Court emphasized
that the unpredictability of high punitive damage awards is “in tension
with the function of the awards as punitive.” 24 It commented:
Thus, a penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so
that even Justice Holmes’s “bad man” can look ahead with some
ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of
action or another. See The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,
459 (1897). And when the bad man’s counterparts turn up from
time to time, the penalty scheme they face ought to threaten them
with a fair probability of suffering in like degree when they wreak
like damage. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)
(noting the need “to reduce unjustified disparities” in criminal
sentencing “and so reach toward the evenhandedness and
neutrality that are the distinguishing marks of any principled
system of justice”). The common sense of justice would surely bar
penalties that reasonable people would think excessive for the
harm caused in the circumstances. 25
The Supreme Court thus emphasized the point that predictability,
21. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008) (citing Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State
Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 267 (2006); THOMAS H.
COHEN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, at 5 (Mar.
2005), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdalc01.pdf; Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote:
A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233, 240 (1996); Erik K. Moller et al., Punitive
Damages in Financial Injury Jury Verdicts, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 333 (1999)).
22. Id. at 500–01 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So.2d 619, 626 (Ala. 1994)).
23. The Supreme Court highlighted that “the Court’s response to outlier punitive-damages
awards has thus far been confined by claims at the constitutional level, and our cases have announced
due process standards that every award must pass.” Id. at 501. In Baker, however, the Court examined
a jury award for punitive damages “for conformity with maritime law, rather than the outer limit
allowed by due process.” Id. at 501–02. In acting “in the position of a common law court of last
review,” id. at 507, it considered punitive damages not with respect to “their intersection with the
Constitution,” but rather in relation to the “desirability of regulating them as a common law remedy,” id.
at 502.
24. Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 502–03.
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consistency, and fairness are fundamental to the deterrence objectives
underlying punitive damages. This sentiment and others associated with
the harms of unpredictability have been echoed repeatedly by lower
courts and scholars.
For example, in the case Payne v. Jones, the Second Circuit explained
the purposes underlying the device of remittitur by emphasizing the
harmful effects of variability and outlying awards, including those
associated with overdeterrence:
Apart from impairing the fairness, predictability and
proportionality of the legal system, judgments awarding
unreasonable amounts as damages impose harmful, burdensome
costs on society. As an initial matter, an excessive verdict that is
allowed to stand establishes a precedent for excessive awards in
later cases. The publicity that accompanies huge punitive damages
awards, see, e.g., Henry Weinstein, Philip Morris Ordered to Pay
$28 Billion to Smoker, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 2002, will encourage
future jurors to impose similarly large amounts. Unchecked
awards levied against significant industries can cause serious harm
to the national economy. Productive companies can be forced into
bankruptcy or out of business. Municipalities can be drained of
essential public resources. The threat of excessive damages,
furthermore, drives up the cost of insurance premiums, deters both
individuals and enterprises from undertaking socially desirable
activities and risks, and encourages overspending on “socially
excessive precautions” that “cost[] more than the reduction of
harm produced by [them].” A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 869, 879 (1998). The prices of goods and services will rise,
and innovation will be inhibited. See id. at 873. 26
Courts have similarly emphasized the need to “minimize the arbitrary
variance in awards bound to result from [the] throw-up-the-hands
approach” that courts regularly use in determining awards for pain and
suffering. 27 Courts and scholars have recognized the need to address
this “standardless, unguided exercise of discretion by the trier of fact,
reviewable . . . pursuant to no standard to guide the reviewing court
either.” 28
In Geressy v. Digital Equipment Corp., Judge Weinstein explained
the court’s decision to consider prior-award information. He discussed
26. Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2013).
27. Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001).
28. Id.
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concern by the courts and legislature regarding the “virtually unbridled
discretion” of juries in awarding damages for pain and suffering, for
which there is “currently no meaningful way to measure such nonquantifiable losses monetarily.” 29 As Professor Oscar Chase explained:
Variability is a problem primarily because it undermines the legal
system’s claim that like cases will be treated alike; the promise of
equal justice under law is an important justification for our legal
system. Variability is also claimed to create instrumental defects;
that is, it makes it harder to settle cases, thus adding unnecessary
transaction costs to the tort system, and delaying payment to
needful plaintiffs. Unpredictability also leads to inefficiencies
because of over- or under-precautions by affected industries and
insurers. 30
Thus, whether for purposes of fairness, deterrence, or another
objective, courts recognize the importance of generating consistent and
predictable damage awards. Indeed, reducing variability is fundamental
to achieving accurate legal outcomes. In Part IV, I consider variability
in the context of error generally, and discuss in more detail what is
meant by “accurate legal outcomes.” First, however, I describe current
methods and proposals for addressing award variability.
III. CURRENT METHODS AND PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING AWARD
VARIABILITY
Additur and Remittitur. Courts use the procedural devices of
additur and remittitur to increase or decrease an award found to be
insufficient or excessive. For example, a defendant may argue for a new
trial based on the excessiveness of the jury’s award. If the judge agrees,
he may offer the plaintiff to reduce the award (remittitur) by some
amount rather than proceeding with a new trial.31 Appellate courts may
also modify awards and address challenges to additur and remittitur. 32
Although the devices of additur and remittitur can, in theory, address
29. Geressy v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Leslie A.
Rubin, Confronting a New Obstacle to Reproductive Choice: Encouraging the Development of RU-486
Through Reform of Products Liability Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 146 (1990–91)).
30. Chase, supra note 9, at 769.
31. David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal
for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive
Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1118–20 (1995).
32. Id. Note, the Supreme Court has distinguished additur from remittitur and held that the
former procedure is violative of the defendant’s Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. See
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1934); see also Baldus et al., supra note 31, at 1119–20.
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the high levels of variability associated with awards for pain and
suffering and punitive damages, in practice they cannot. First, additur
and remittitur are primarily used to address excessive awards, and are
infrequently used to adjust inadequate awards. 33 Second, these
procedures are generally reserved for only the most extreme cases—they
are used to address extreme outliers that are deemed incorrect, rather
than address variability in general. 34 Third, courts lack consistent and
principled procedures for arriving at better award determinations than
juries. As Judge Posner opined in Jutzi-Johnson v. United States,
“[most courts] treat the determination of how much damages for pain
and suffering to award as a standardless, unguided exercise of discretion
by the trier of fact, reviewable for abuse of discretion pursuant to no
standard to guide the reviewing court either.” 35 Further, courts employ
these devices infrequently; 36 and widespread replacement of jury
awards with judicial determinations would be problematic with respect
to the Seventh Amendment and fundamental principles of tort law.
Damage Caps. Similarly, damage caps, which place upper limits on
damage awards or certain types of damage awards, are widely
recognized as a particularly poor method for addressing variability. 37

33.
34.
35.
36.

See Baldus et al., supra note 31, at 1119–20.
See id. at 1118–20.
Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001).
See Baldus et al., supra note 31, at 1119–21 (citing MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A.
PETERSON, RAND: THE INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, POSTTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY AWARDS vii–viii,
43–47 (1987), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3511.pdf, and others). Baldus
et al. note that “[o]n the basis of post-trial information in the 880 1982–84 California and Cook County,
Illinois cases reported in [the Shanley and Peterson study], we estimate that in cases involving a
damages award, there was a remittitur or new trial 6% of the time and an additur or a negotiated increase
in the award in 2–3% of the cases.” Id. at 1120 n.21. See also Joseph Sanders, Why Do Proposals
Designed to Control Variability in General Damages (Generally) Fall on Deaf Ears? (and Why This Is
Too Bad), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 489, 503 (2006).
37. Damage caps have served as the primary tool of tort reform aiming to address variability.
Legislation for caps boomed during heightened calls for tort reform in the 1970s and 1980s, and by
1987, twenty-three states had instituted caps ranging from $150,000 to $1,000,000. Sanders, supra note
36, at 510; see also Stephen D. Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 399–400 (2006). Since then, numerous other states have adopted caps in various
contexts as well. Sanders, supra note 36, at 510. Statutory caps may be applied to specific types of
damages, such as punitive damages or general damages, or damage awards generally. See Baldus et al.,
supra note 31, at 1121–23. They may be applied in particular contexts, such as medical malpractice.
See generally Kathryn Zeiler, Turning from Damage Caps to Information Disclosure: An Alternative to
Tort Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 385 (2005). And they can appear in a variety of
forms. For example, juries can be informed of damage caps explicitly, or a cap can be applied by the
court only after a jury has exceeded it. See generally Saks et al., supra note 15, at 245. In general,
juries are not informed of caps; but, regardless, jurors may be aware of such measures. See id. Under
some proposals, a judge may be permitted to reduce awards below the quantity provided by the
legislation; in others, a judge may be permitted only to reduce an award to the established quantity. See
Colleen P. Murphy, Statutory Caps and Judicial Review of Damages, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1001, 1002–08
(2006).
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They give rise to a range of problems inherent in capping damages (or
certain types of damages) outright, independent of the circumstances of
the case or harm suffered by the plaintiff.
First, caps address only the most extreme cases, and only excessive
awards. Second, caps are likely to play a role primarily in cases in
which the harm is very severe. If, for example, there is a cap of $1
million, the cap may not affect an individual who suffered a broken
nose, but may greatly affect an individual who suffered paralysis. The
cap is unlikely to address variability in the former case, while possibly
causing an inappropriately low award in the latter. 38 Thus, aside from
biasing the award, caps distort incentives to litigate tort claims based on
severe harm. Further, caps can cause suboptimal risk-taking by diluting
the deterrence effect of punitive damages and tort law generally. 39
Third, a number of studies have concluded that caps may in fact
exacerbate the variability problem rather than address it. In particular,
jurors who are aware of a cap may anchor to it, and their awards may
gravitate to it. “Thus, those with the most severe injuries and losses will
be unfairly deprived of compensation by caps. In addition, by serving as
a psychological anchor, caps appear likely to further exaggerate the
error of overcompensating those with smaller losses.” 40
But, notwithstanding the foregoing problems, damage caps are used,
due, in part, to their administrative convenience and their ability to
control insurance rates. 41
Comparable-Case Information. Finally, a number of courts and
commentators have proposed methods involving the use of information
regarding awards in prior comparable cases. Such proposals have
appeared in various forms. One set of approaches builds on courts’
regular use of comparability review, whereby trial and appellate courts
consider awards in comparable cases in their review of a trier of fact’s
award for excessiveness. 42 These proposals attempt to develop a more
structured framework for the court’s comparative analysis—for
example, instituting a method by which a court identifies a universe of
comparable claims; examines whether the current award “deviates
materially from what would be reasonable compensation” (to use
language from a New York statute upon which such proposals seem to

38. See Baldus et al., supra note 31, at 1121–23.
39. See Sanders, supra note 36, at 509–11. Constitutionality issues may arise as well.
Opponents of caps have argued, for example, that caps are violative of a plaintiff’s right to a trial by
jury. See Zeiler, supra note 37, at 387.
40. Saks et al., supra note 15, at 245. See also Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation
to Anchors for Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 991 (1995).
41. See Sanders, supra note 36, at 511.
42. See Baldus et al., supra note 31, at 1134.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol85/iss1/1

10

Bavli: Logic of Comparable-Case Guidance

2017]

THE LOGIC OF COMPARABLE-CASE GUIDANCE

11

build); 43 and, if so, determines a suitable adjustment of the jury award. 44
These review-based methods have the advantage of involving only
modest modifications to current well-accepted methods, but they are not
ideal. Specifically, they incorporate comparable-case information on
review rather than in the award directly. As such, they only focus on
outlying awards rather than on variability in general. Moreover, regular
use of such methods arguably leads to constitutionality and tort issues
associated with the replacement of a jury’s discretion with that of the
judge. 45
As indicated in the Introduction, another set of proposals uses various
types of schedules to bind or guide the trier of fact in its determination
of certain types of damage awards. 46 These proposals, to the extent they
involve binding a trier of fact to predetermined values or ranges of
values, have been criticized as impinging on the trier of fact’s discretion,
and as “inconsistent with the basic tort principle that each victim is
entitled to an award tailored to his or her circumstances, set by a lay
jury.” 47 To the extent that such methods bind rather than guide the trier
of fact, and to the extent that they involve award values that are
predetermined arbitrarily, for example, by a legislative body in advance
of the case, such methods are arguably problematic.
Finally, a number of proposals—overlapping with the category above
regarding schedules—involve comparability analysis, whereby the court
(perhaps by way of an adversarial process involving the litigation
parties, and even the trier of fact) identifies a set of materially
comparable cases, provides the trier of fact with certain information
regarding the awards in these cases in the context of a jury instruction or
presented as expert testimony, and instructs the trier of fact to determine
an appropriate damages award in light of the evidence introduced in the
case and the comparable-case information. 48
43. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
44. See Baldus et al., supra note 31, at 1134. See also Sanders, supra note 36, at 503.
45. See Colleen P. Murphy, Judicial Assessment of Legal Remedies, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 153, 192
(1999); J. Patrick Elsevier, Out-of-Line: Federal Courts Using Comparability to Review Damage
Awards, 33 GA. L. REV. 243, 258–59 (1998) (“Comparability analysis [on review] requires a court to
engage in several subjective, fact-intensive inquiries . . . . Yet, by asserting that comparability provides
an objective framework to review compensatory damage awards, courts are able to substitute their own
assessment of what the appropriate damage award should be, while skirting the Seventh Amendment’s
proscription against reexamination of issues of fact.”).
46. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 9, at 945.
47. Logan, supra note 14, at 943.
48. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 9, at 777–90 (proposing that courts inform jurors of “the range of
awards made by other juries in the same state for such damages during a contemporaneous time period,”
to be provided as nonbinding guidance in the court’s charge to the jury in the form of a “chart
constructed to allow comparison with roughly similar cases in which plaintiffs’ verdicts were
recovered.”). See generally Baldus et al., supra note 31, at 1123–24; Saks et al., supra note 15, at 246;
Sanders, supra note 36, at 506–07; JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE
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As suggested in the Introduction, such methods—and CCG methods
in particular—avoid many of the problems caused by other methods,
such as damage caps and binding or predetermined schedules. These
methods allow for a flexible case-by-case analysis in the discretion of
the trier of fact, while still providing substantial guidance. Nevertheless,
such methods have been attacked on the grounds that, instead of
addressing the fundamental issue of assessing the value of pain and
suffering damages or an appropriate punitive damages award, they may
compound the unpredictability of damage awards by providing the trier
of fact with information regarding damages awarded in separate and
distinct prior cases that presumably suffer from the same arbitrariness
that the court aims to address in the present case. 49 In the following
parts, I address these objections.
IV. THE LOGIC OF CCG
In this part, I explain why, notwithstanding the objections delineated
above, CCG methods reduce unpredictability and improve the accuracy
of awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages generally. I
begin by discussing what is meant by “accuracy.”
A. Bias and Variance: The Elements of Error
Part II makes clear that controlling the variability of awards for pain
and suffering and punitive damages is important. But reducing
variability does not necessarily mean improving the award. For
example, it is likely unwise to encourage jurors to anchor to an arbitrary
value, notwithstanding associated variability benefits.
In fact,
variability could be zero if the court were to dictate an award without
regard to the particulars of the case.
Courts and scholars are correct to be concerned about the high
variability associated with awards for pain and suffering and punitive
damages. But good policy requires steps toward reducing such
variability only insofar as they improve awards generally.
Thus, for purposes of considering the concepts of “error” and
“accuracy” in the context of damage awards, assume that there is some
“correct” award that could, in theory, be determined as a function of
perfect information regarding the state of the world, including the facts
§ 8:32 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO
IMPROVE THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM 10–15 (1987)); Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753,
758–61 (7th Cir. 2001).
49. See Geistfeld, supra note 11, at 792; Avraham, supra note 19, at 104; Logan, supra note 14,
at 943–44.
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of the case and applicable law and norms. 50 Of course, we neither have
perfect information nor know the correct award. Instead, the court asks
a jury to arrive at an award, which will serve as an estimate of the
correct outcome.
More concretely, let us consider the correct award in a given case—
say, for example, the BMW case described in the Introduction—to be
the mean of the population of possible awards that would emerge from
adjudicating the case repeatedly under various conditions (e.g., before
different judges and juries, by different attorneys, with different
permutations of facts, etc.). 51 A single trial thus generates a sample
from the population and an estimate of the correct award. 52 Call the
actual award an “estimate,” and the process that generates the estimate
an “estimator.” 53 We can then define “error” in terms of distance, and
(equivalently) “accuracy” in terms of proximity, between the estimate
and the correct award. 54
I define the reliability of a legal procedure as the accuracy of the
outcome (here, the award) that we can expect by following the
procedure. If we expect that a certain legal procedure will produce an
accurate award, we say that the procedure (or, for simplicity, the award)
is “reliable.” 55
50. See Hillel J. Bavli, Aggregating for Accuracy: A Closer Look at Sampling and Accuracy in
Class Action Litigation, 14 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 67, 74–78 (2015). We can similarly consider a
range or distribution of “correct” awards that reflects, for example, uncertainty regarding the law. Id. at
74 n.24.
51. Id. at 74–78 (citing Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The
Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815,
833–34 (1992)). For simplicity, I ignore the potential for bias. As noted in Bavli, supra note 50, at 74
n.29, “[i]t may be more intuitive to consider the concept of a ‘correct’ verdict in the context of a
criminal trial. Consider, for example, the O.J. Simpson murder trial. Polls show that over 50% of
Americans believe that the jury arrived at an incorrect verdict. Implicit in the public’s disagreement
with the verdict is an assumption that there exists a ‘correct’ outcome. The framework described above
is intuitive: had the jury known the true facts of the case, and had there been no ambiguity regarding the
application of the law to the facts of the case, the jury would have arrived at the correct conclusion. But
given ambiguity regarding either the facts of a case or the state of the law, it is unclear whether a
criminal defendant in fact satisfied the elements of the crime charged; and the jury must arrive at a
verdict—‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’—which serves as an estimate of the correct outcome, ‘guilty’ or ‘not
guilty.’” Similarly, the determination of a civil damages award (or, e.g., a prison sentence) can be
understood as an estimate of a correct outcome. Arguably courts implicitly acknowledge this
characterization when, for example, a court finds a jury award to be excessive or inadequate. Finally,
the formulation of the correct award as the mean of the population of possible awards from repeated
adjudications is intended to capture, e.g., the state of the law as understood by various judges and the
norms of the time and facts of the case as understood by various combinations of jurors.
52. See id. at 74–75; Saks & Blanck, supra note 51, at 833–34.
53. The estimator, in the current context, can be understood as the procedure (broadly speaking)
that generates the legal outcome, which, in our example, is the jury’s punitive damages award.
Mathematically, it is a random variable that, once “realized,” or decided, becomes an estimate.
54. See Bavli, supra note 50, at 74–78.
55. See generally id.
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In statistics there are two sources of error: bias and variance. If an
estimator is “unbiased,” then it will generate the correct value on
average. If it is “biased,” then it will generate the incorrect value on
average, and the “bias” reflects the distance between the value the
estimator generates on average and the correct value. Bias is therefore a
source of error. Note that it is possible that an unbiased estimator will
never generate the correct value—to be unbiased is only to generate the
correct value in expectation, or on average. Additionally, although
unbiasedness is generally understood as a good characteristic for an
estimator to have, it does not indicate lack of error, since the values
generated by the estimator can vary wildly around the correct value. For
example, if the correct punitive damages value in the BMW case above
is $100,000, then repetitions of an unbiased adjudication may generate
estimate values (i.e., damage awards) of $0, $50,000, $150,000, and
$200,000, which are indeed centered at the correct value of $100,000;
however, the awards are highly dispersed around $100,000. We would,
for example, prefer that repeated adjudications generate the values
$90,000, $95,000, $105,000, and $110,000; or even better, $100,000,
$100,000, $100,000, and $100,000.
Thus, the second source of error is “variance,” which is a measure of
dispersion. In particular, if an estimator entails a high level of variance,
then it will generate estimates that are highly dispersed around its mean,
or average, value. If the estimator entails a high level of variance, but is
unbiased, then it will generate estimates that are highly dispersed around
the correct value. In this case, we say that the estimator is “unbiased,”
but that it lacks “precision.” If the estimator is “precise” but “biased,”
then it generates values that are tightly centered around the wrong
value—an undesirable circumstance. If an estimator is “precise” and
“unbiased,” then it will generate estimates that are close in proximity to
the correct value, and we say that it is “accurate.”
Thus, in the BMW example above, the awards $90,000, $95,000,
$105,000, and $110,000 reflect greater precision than $0, $50,000,
$150,000, and $200,000. And, the awards $100,000, $100,000,
$100,000, and $100,000 reflect even greater precision.
More formally, let α be the “correct” award and 𝛼� a random variable
defined by the actual award. Let 𝐸(𝛼�) be the expectation of 𝛼�. In other
words, 𝛼� will equal 𝐸(𝛼�) on average; and if we repeat the trial many
times then the average of the punitive damage awards will be
approximately 𝐸(𝛼�).
Bias is defined as the difference between the expectation of the
estimator 𝛼� and the correct award α (the object we are trying to
estimate). More formally, 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 = 𝐸(𝛼�) − 𝛼, and it is said that the
estimator 𝛼� is “unbiased” if 𝐸(𝛼�) = 𝛼.
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Additionally, let 𝑉(𝛼�) be the variance of 𝛼�, where variance is defined
in the standard way. That is,
𝑛
1
2
2
𝑉(𝛼�) = 𝐸�𝛼� − 𝐸(𝛼�)� = ��𝛼�𝑖 − 𝐸(𝛼�)� .
𝑛
𝑖=1

The variance of the realized awards is thus the average of the square
differences between the awards and the average of the awards. For
example, the variance of $0, $50,000, $150,000, and $200,000 is
1
(($0 − $100,000)2 + ($50,000 − $100,000)2 + ($150,000 −
4
$100,000)2 + ($200,000 − $100,000)2 ). The standard deviation of 𝛼�
is the square root of the variance: 𝑆𝐷(𝛼�) = �𝑉(𝛼�).
Now let us formally define error in terms of bias and variance. There
are many ways to measure error (just as there are many ways to
measure, for example, dispersion). For instance, we might define error
by the raw differences between the estimates and the correct value. But
just as it is inconvenient for scientists to define dispersion by calculating
the raw differences between the estimates and the mean of the
estimates, 56 similar inconveniences arise from defining error in terms of
raw differences. It turns out that a convenient and often suitable
measure of error is the well-accepted mean squared error (MSE),
defined as 𝑀𝑆𝐸(𝛼�) = 𝐸[(𝛼� − 𝛼)2 ]. In words, we find the expectation
of the square difference between the estimator and the correct value.
Now, using MSE as our measure of error, it is easy to show that:
𝑀𝑆𝐸(𝛼�) = 𝐸[(𝛼� − 𝛼)2 ] = 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 2

That is, error (defined here as MSE) can be separated into two
elements: bias and variance. 57
B. Reducing Variability and Error with Prior-Award Information
Let us view a civil case as an estimation problem within the
framework described above. That is, for every claim let us assume that
there is a correct damages award (or, in particular, a correct award for
pain and suffering or punitive damages) α, defined as the mean of the
population of awards that would result from repeated adjudications, as
described above (and that would reflect, for example, perfect

56. For example, using such differences results in the “canceling” of positive and negative
values.
57. See SHARON L. LOHR, SAMPLING: DESIGN AND ANALYSIS, § 2.2 (2d ed. 2010), for a
mathematical proof, and a lengthier discussion, of the bias-variance decomposition.
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information regarding the applicable law and the facts of the case). 58 As
discussed, we cannot know the correct award and must therefore arrive
at a suitable estimate 𝛼� of the unknown correct award.
Thus, let us assume (for simplicity rather than necessity) that, on
average, the estimate will equal the correct award, but that it entails
some degree of variability σ2 around the correct award. That is, 𝛼� is
distributed with mean α and variance σ2. Notationally, 𝛼� ~ (𝛼, 𝜎 2 ).
Our goal is to arrive at a damages estimate that is close to the correct
award—that is “accurate” in the sense of minimizing error, as defined
above by 𝑀𝑆𝐸(𝛼�) = 𝐸[(𝛼� − 𝛼)2 ].
In statistics, and the sciences generally, determining a good estimator
for an unknown quantity is very important and is the subject of much
research. Let us use an analogy to better understand the problem and
possible solutions. Consider a study by statisticians Bradley Efron and
Carl Morris, in which they recorded batting average data for each of
eighteen major league baseball players through his first forty-five
official at bats of the 1970 season. 59 Suppose our goal is (as their goal
was) to estimate the batting averages that would emerge for each player
during the remainder of the season, using only the data collected. Let us
focus on one player, Roberto Clemente, whose batting average for his
first forty-five at bats was .400. 60
Initially, it might seem elementary that a player’s batting average for
the first forty-five at bats would serve as the best estimator for his
batting average for the remainder of the season. Thus, our estimate of
Clemente’s remainder-of-the-season (or “after-forty-five”) batting
average would be .400. But it can be shown mathematically and
empirically that this is not in fact the best estimator. In particular, this
estimator—Clemente’s batting average for his first forty-five at bats—
can be improved by incorporating information regarding the batting
averages for the first forty-five at bats of the other seventeen players. 61
But why should this be? Why should the batting averages of Munson or
Kessinger, who had “first-forty-five” batting averages of .156 and .289,
respectively, have any influence on our estimate of Clemente’s afterforty-five batting average? Using other players’ first-forty-five batting
averages would seem obvious in the absence of Clemente’s first-fortyfive average; but we have Clemente’s first-forty-five batting average—
58. See Bavli, supra note 50, at 74–78. We can define the correct award using other measures of
central tendency, such as the median, depending on how we want to characterize it. The mean, for
example, is more sensitive than the median to extreme awards. For simplicity, the analysis in this article
focuses only on the mean.
59. See Bradley Efron & Carl Morris, Data Analysis Using Stein’s Estimator and Its
Generalizations, 70 J. AM. STATISTICAL ASS’N 311, 312–14 (1975).
60. Id. at 313.
61. See id. at 312–14.
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and what could be better than that?
The explanation lies in the information we obtain from the first-fortyfive batting averages of the other seventeen players. First, suppose we
know nothing about batting averages. It seems intuitive that, in
estimating Clemente’s after-forty-five batting average, it is helpful to
know whether his first-forty-five batting average, .400, is low, high, or
average. In particular, it seems helpful to know that .400 is an
extremely high batting average. As an extreme example, if we are told
that, in a given period, a particular batting average is the highest ever
achieved by that player, or in baseball in general, would we still use this
average as our best estimate of the player’s average in the next period?
We would be wise to incorporate this information, since the player is
unlikely to break baseball’s all-time record twice in a row. More
specifically, the usefulness of other-player information can be explained,
in part, by considering the old idea (due to Sir Francis Galton) of
“regression toward the mean,” which, in its simplest form, states that if
we obtain a relatively extreme measurement, then upon remeasurement,
we are likely to obtain a new measurement closer to average. 62 The
reason is simple: an extreme measurement can be attributed to a
combination of two things—the characteristics of the thing measured
(e.g., the skill of a baseball player who was in fact a far superior batter
than his peers) and random variation, or “luck.” To the extent that the
extreme measurement is due to randomness, it is likely to be less
extreme upon remeasurement. Similarly, information regarding other
players’ performance provides context for Clemente’s performance, and
an estimator that incorporates such information is likely better than one
based solely on the player’s individual performance. 63
In short, if we believe that the players’ batting averages are somehow
bound together, we can make significant estimation improvements by
incorporating other-player information. 64
Returning to the legal context, the value of a damages award (or,
specifically, an award for pain and suffering or punitive damages) can
be understood as attributable to 1) the application of the law to the

62. See generally Stephen M. Stigler, Darwin, Galton and the Statistical Enlightenment, 173 J.
ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 469 (2010).
63. We can consider two sources of variability: there is variation among the players (some are
better than others, for example), and, given a particular player (and given his mean batting average in
particular), there is variation in the player’s batting average. “Regression toward the mean” thus
operates in two ways: first, on the latter source, pulling a player’s batting average in toward his mean
batting average, and second, on the former source, pulling a player’s batting average in toward the
league’s mean batting average. Incorporating other-player information allows us to account for the pull
toward the league’s mean batting average.
64. See generally Efron & Morris, supra note 59; Bradley Efron & Carl Morris, Stein’s Paradox
in Statistics, 236 SCI. AM. 119 (1977).
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particular facts of the case, and 2) random variation. In order to gain a
deeper understanding of the benefits of CCG, let us model an award
“hierarchically” to account for both of the foregoing elements. As
above, we assume that the actual award 𝛼� is distributed with mean α and
variance σ2. But now, let us assume that α is itself random rather than
constant, and that it is distributed with mean µ and variance τ2.
Notationally, 𝛼� ~ (𝛼, 𝜎 2 ) and 𝛼 ~ (𝜇, 𝜏 2 ). In words, the hierarchical
model incorporates variability on two levels. First, the upper level
�𝛼 ~ (𝜇, 𝜏 2 )� indicates that cases are heterogeneous—that there can be
factual variability across cases, and that the present case may be
materially different from prior cases. I refer to this form of variability,
τ2, as “claim variability.” 65 Second, the lower level (𝛼� ~ (𝛼, 𝜎 2 ))
indicates that, given the facts of any single case (for example, the
present case), there is variability (i.e., randomness) in the determination
of damages. I refer to this form of variability, σ2, as “judgment
variability.” 66
Again, our goal is to arrive at a good estimate 𝛼� of α. On one hand,
we want the estimate to reflect the first form of variability—that
meaningful factual differences (e.g., between the present case and prior
cases) should result in different awards. On the other hand, we want to
minimize the second form of variability—the randomness associated
with the determination of damages in a given case. So how does
incorporating prior-award information help? Unfortunately, since we
generally do not know the correct damages award, it is impossible to
distinguish the former form of variability from the latter. In other
words, a tradeoff arises between minimizing bias—that our estimated
damages award should, on average, be as close to the correct damages
award as possible, reflecting the former form of variability—and
minimizing variance, the degree of randomness associated with the
estimated award.
Thus, in a sense, incorporating prior-award
information as guidance in determining a damages award allows the fact
finder (implicitly) to strike a balance between bias and variance so as to
minimize error. By accepting the possibility of introducing some bias
due to material differences between the present case and prior cases, it is
possible to gain far more in terms of accuracy, due to the reduction in
award variability that follows from such guidance.
Furthermore, the incorporation of prior-award information should not
be viewed as suffering from circularity—that is, as a method that is
defeated by its reliance on information that entails the same flaws that
65. See Bavli, supra note 50, at 74–78.
66. See id. (discussing “judgment variability” and “claim variability”); see also Hillel J. Bavli,
Sampling and Reliability in Class Action Litigation, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 207, 210–12
(2016).
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the method is itself attempting to address. Rather, such methods should
be understood as facilitating the improvement of awards by allowing for
information sharing across cases. In the framework described, for
example, an ideal method for reducing error from variability would
generate a damages award by repeatedly adjudicating a case many times
independently and using the mean of the repeated adjudications as the
ultimate award. But such methods are generally impractical. Methods
involving the incorporation of prior-award information can be
understood as efficient alternatives. Such methods aim to control
variability through information sharing across different cases, rather
than across replications of the same case. The cost of efficiently
reducing judgment variability, however, is the potential for bias arising
from claim variability.
In order to gain a better understanding of the effects of prior-award
information on error, let us consider two extreme scenarios. First,
suppose that the prior-award information is “dogmatic” in the sense that
it entirely dominates the damages award without leaving room for any
influence from the facts of the present case itself—for example, suppose
the jury decides dogmatically simply to apply the average of the
previous awards as its award determination, without consideration of the
facts of the current case. In this case, there would be no error from
variability, since the average of the previous damage awards is constant;
but to the extent that the average of the prior awards is different from the
correct current award α, there would be substantial error from bias. On
the other hand, suppose that the prior-award information has no
influence on the current damages award—for example, suppose the jury
decides dogmatically that it will arrive at an award determination based
on the facts of the case alone, without influence from prior damage
awards. In this case, assuming jury damage determinations are initially
(i.e., without influence from prior awards) unbiased—that is, they
achieve the correct award α on average—then there would be no error
from bias, but substantial error from variability.
CCG improves the accuracy of awards for pain and suffering and
punitive damages—award types that suffer from particularly high
degrees of variability—by facilitating a balance between minimizing
variability and introducing the possibility of bias. The quality of the
balance is determined by the strength of the method for identifying
comparable cases and distilling information for consideration by the
trier of fact.
To be sure, let us consider two important issues. First, assuming an
“appropriate” set of prior cases, what is the ideal level of influence that
should be afforded to prior-award information? Second, how can we be
certain that the prior cases identified are sufficiently comparable to the
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present case so as to improve accuracy?
The first issue—the ideal influence of prior-award information,
assuming an appropriate set of prior cases—depends on the judgment
variability (σ2) of the award in the present case and the claim variability
(τ2) of the prior cases. Higher judgment variability suggests weaker
information obtained from the present case and greater influence of the
prior awards; higher claim variability suggests weaker information
obtained from the prior cases and greater influence of the present case.
For example, consider a tort case in which the evidence against the
defendant is overwhelming and the damages incurred by the plaintiff are
clear. Assume that the evidence is sufficiently strong that, if the case
were litigated ten times independently, the damage awards in all ten
replications would be approximately the same—say, $100,000. In this
case, the evidence is so great and the judgment variability so low
(almost zero) that there is little to be gained from introducing prioraward information and the possibility of bias. On the other hand,
consider a case in which, although there may be strong evidence
regarding the facts of the case, there is only weak evidence regarding the
appropriate damages award—as is almost always the case for awards for
pain and suffering and punitive damages. If the case were repeatedly
adjudicated ten times independently, the damage awards across the ten
replications would vary wildly. In this case, the damages award is
highly variable and there is much to be gained by introducing prioraward information. Further, the prior-award information is especially
beneficial if claim variability is low and prior awards provide clear
information. For example, assume that the facts and legal issues in the
present case are clear, and that the court confidently identifies a set of
ten comparable cases that involve similar facts—for example, similar
injuries arising from similar circumstances. Assume further that the
damages awarded in the ten cases are very similar—say, approximately
$50,000. In this case, in which judgment variability is high and claim
variability is low, prior-award information should have a high degree of
influence. 67

67. More formally, it can be shown that, if, as above, the damages award 𝛼� is distributed with
mean α and variance σ2, and the correct damages award α is distributed with mean µ and variance τ2
(thus, if we have judgment variability σ2 and claim variability τ2), then the optimal damages award
weights current case information by 1/σ2 and prior-award information by 1/τ2. In other words, the ideal
influence of the prior awards (and particularly the mean of the prior awards) is inversely proportional to
the claim variability (τ2) of the prior awards relative to the judgment variability (σ2) of the award in the
present case. See generally Efron & Morris, supra note 59; W. James & Charles Stein, Estimation with
Quadratic Loss, 1 PROC. OF THE FOURTH BERKELEY SYMP. ON MATHEMATICAL STAT. AND
PROBABILITY 361 (1961). Note that since we cannot, in practice, know the value of µ, the mean of the
correct awards, we instead estimate µ using the mean of the prior awards, and “shrink” toward this
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It is worth reemphasizing here that it is incorrect to conclude, as
numerous commentators have, that, because prior awards may suffer
from the same arbitrariness that we aim to address in the present case,
CCG would be ineffective in reducing (or, worse, would compound)
award variability. Even assuming the (not-unlikely) scenario that
judgment variability is approximately equal across cases (as I have
assumed above), the foregoing analysis makes clear that the ideal
influence of prior-award information can nevertheless be very high. In
other words, CCG may nevertheless significantly reduce variability and
improve accuracy. This makes sense, since CCG allows for the sharing
of information across numerous (although variable) cases; it provides
significant guidance where relevant information is otherwise scarce.
Consider an extreme example in which judgment variability is
extremely high for all cases (the prior cases as well as the present case)
and claim variability is extremely low. Here, although prior awards
suffer from the same extreme arbitrariness that we aim to address in the
present award, a court would benefit immensely from CCG methods.
Specifically, because claim variability is extremely low, the prior-award
information obtained here would be approximately equivalent to prioraward information that could be obtained from the “ideal” procedure
described above, whereby a damages award is calculated by averaging
over awards obtained from repeated independent adjudications (with
different juries, judges, lawyers, presentations of the evidence, etc.) of a
single case, the case at hand. The awards obtained from repeated
adjudications would vary considerably, since judgment variability is
extremely high. But the ultimate award, calculated by averaging all of
the awards obtained from the repeated adjudications, is extremely
precise—it is subject to almost no variability.
As suggested above, methods involving repeated adjudication are
ideal but costly. CCG methods are efficient alternatives that come at the
cost of possible bias that may arise due to “misalignment”—where the
mean of the correct awards in the prior cases is different from the
correct award in the subject case—and perhaps due to claim variability,
or heterogeneity in the set of prior cases. 68 In our current example,
however, bias is not a problem, because there is no misalignment
problem and claim variability is assumed to be extremely low. Thus,
although the prior awards are subject to extremely high judgment
variability, in the aggregate they allow for an extremely accurate
value. We can estimate the variance terms as well. Notationally, the “shrinkage estimator” can be
written as

� 𝜇
𝛼
2 +𝜏2
1
+
𝜎2 𝜏2

𝛼�𝑠 = 𝜎1

.

68. See infra note 81.
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outcome through the sharing of information across cases. Furthermore,
we can relax the assumption of extremely low claim variability. Higher
claim variability may cause bias; but the harm to accuracy associated
with any introduction of bias is often well outweighed by the accuracy
benefits associated with the reduction in judgment variability. In any
case, the introduction of claim variability does not affect the conclusion
that CCG methods are effective in reducing judgment variability and
improving accuracy notwithstanding the potential arbitrariness
associated with the prior awards.
The second issue—the accuracy benefits of CCG in light of the actual
comparability of the prior awards—depends on whether the potential for
bias is outweighed by the benefits of reducing variability. This is a valid
concern in the sense that the accuracy benefits of CCG are indeed
dependent on the material comparability of the prior cases to the present
case.
For two reasons, however, the likelihood of identifying a set of cases
sufficiently inappropriate, relative to the present case, to harm accuracy
is very low. First, because awards for pain and suffering and punitive
damages are highly variable, the potential accuracy benefits of CCG are
great. As discussed above, the higher the variability of the award, the
greater the potential benefits of CCG and the greater our tolerance for
bias. The potential for harm from bias arising from misalignment would
be more concerning, for example, if a court were interested in applying
prior-award information to reduce the already-low variability of an
award for a certain type of economic damages. However, the high
variability of awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages—
sufficiently high to prompt drastic (and highly biasing) measures such as
damage caps—suggests that the benefits with respect to variability are
likely to dominate any bias arising from misalignment (or any negative
effects arising from high claim variability).
Second, the bias introduced by CCG methods is likely to be low.
Statistically, the appropriateness of a set of comparable cases, relative to
the present case, involves three major factors: 1) the “alignment” of the
mean of the correct awards in the prior cases with the correct award in
the present case, 2) the variability of the correct awards in the prior
cases, and 3) the number of prior cases, or the “sample size.” In
practice, a court should be concerned with the alignment of the material
facts of the prior cases with those of the present case, the substantive
breadth of the prior cases, and the sample size.
Note that we cannot perfectly predict how a trier of fact will in fact
incorporate guidance from prior awards.
For purposes of this
discussion, and for the guidance I provide in Part V below regarding the
development of comparable-case information, I assume that the trier of
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fact will not act “irrationally” by affording more influence to highly
dispersed prior awards than to minimally dispersed prior awards. It is
not necessary for the trier of fact to behave perfectly rationally, but the
foregoing assumption provides a good starting point for guidance. We
trust the trier of fact to act approximately rationally in numerous legal
contexts; and in developing guidance for the trier of fact, the court
arguably should assume some degree of rationality, as it does in
providing other forms of guidance.
Statistically (using fundamentals of “shrinkage estimation”),
incorporating prior-award information will generally improve accuracy,
as long as the prior awards are not tightly bound (i.e., with low
variability) around a mean that is far from the correct award in the
present case 69—in practice, as long as the prior awards are not tightly
clustered around an award that reflects facts materially and substantially
dissimilar to the present case.
High prior-award variability itself is (absent extreme conditions)
unlikely to harm the damages award, since the variability of awards for
pain and suffering and punitive damages is high, and, as suggested by
the discussion above, the weight afforded the prior-award information
(and, statistically, the mean of the prior awards in particular) is
proportional to the inverse of the variability of the prior awards. This
means that highly dispersed prior awards (e.g., prior awards that span a
wide range of values) will have little influence on the award
determination.
Additionally, although misaligned prior cases can cause significant
bias, this concern fades when we consider the relatively remote
conditions necessary for CCG to harm accuracy, in the sense of
increasing award error. In particular, for CCG to harm accuracy, it
would generally require a combination of significantly dissimilar cases
and low prior-award variability—a combination that is highly unlikely if
the prior cases are specifically selected to be comparable to the present
case, and where the variability of the awards can often reflect (and
perhaps should reflect) the court’s level of confidence regarding the
comparability of the prior cases to the present case. 70
In short, we can expect that a reasonable method for identifying prior
comparable cases will result in prior-award information that is likely to
improve accuracy, and therefore reliability. 71 Of course, the more
comparable the prior cases are to the present case, the better the
guidance for the fact finder, and the greater the accuracy benefits. In the
69. See generally Efron & Morris, supra note 59; James & Stein, supra note 67.
70. See infra Part V for a discussion of methods for selecting comparable cases.
71. A formal derivation of the particular mean and variability conditions that would cause a
reduction in accuracy is beyond the scope of the current article.
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following part, I discuss in greater detail the development of
comparable-case information.
V. DEVELOPING COMPARABLE-CASE INFORMATION
In this part, I discuss a number of considerations for establishing
comparable-case (or “prior-award”) information. I address two areas of
concern: 1) identifying a set of materially comparable cases, and 2)
distilling comparable-case information from these cases for
consideration by the trier of fact.
A. Identifying Comparable Cases
To use CCG, a court must identify a set of comparable cases. As
suggested above, a court should be concerned with three factors: the
alignment of the prior cases with the subject case, the breadth of the
prior cases, and the number of prior cases. The suitability of the cases
and expected benefits of the guidance depend on the courts care in
balancing these factors. For example, prior awards with lower breadth
generally produce, in a sense, more specific, and therefore more
influential, guidance; but lower breadth also results in a smaller sample
size, whereas a larger sample provides more information and therefore
better guidance. Additionally, the alignment of the prior cases affects
the bias introduced by the prior awards; and the breadth of the prior
cases, which affects the weight or influence of the prior awards, may
reflect the court’s confidence in the alignment of the cases identified.
In terms of alignment and breadth, the most significant factor
affecting a court’s identification of prior cases is likely its understanding
of the subject case and which facts and issues are fundamental to an
appropriate comparison.
Consider, for example, Judge Posner’s analysis in Jutzi-Johnson.
That case involved allegations that a jail was negligent in failing to
identify a prisoner as a suicide risk and take precautionary measures,
resulting in the prisoner hanging himself. Commenting on the parties’
identification of comparison cases, Judge Posner explained:
The plaintiff cites three cases in which damages for pain and
suffering ranging from $600,000 to $1 million were awarded, but
in each one the pain and suffering continued for hours, not
minutes. The defendant confined its search for comparable cases
to other prison suicide cases, implying that prisoners experience
pain and suffering differently from other persons, so that it makes
more sense to compare Johnson’s pain and suffering to that of a
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prisoner who suffered a toothache than to that of a free person who
was strangled, and concluding absurdly that any award for pain
and suffering in this case that exceeded $5,000 would be
excessive. The parties should have looked at awards in other cases
involving asphyxiation, for example cases of drowning, which are
numerous . . . . Had they done so, they would have come up with
an award in the range of $15,000 to $150,000. 72
Judge Posner thus disagreed with the alignment of the plaintiff’s
cases, which involved pain and suffering that continued for hours rather
than minutes. He also disagreed with the alignment, as well as the
breadth, of the defendant’s cases, which were “confined” to “other
prison suicide cases”—as though “prisoners experience pain and
suffering differently from other persons”—leading to “absurd”
conclusions regarding a suitable award. 73 Finally, Judge Posner
displayed concern for sample size, suggesting that widening the breadth
of the prior cases to those involving other forms of asphyxiation would
have resulted in “numerous” prior cases for comparison. 74 Sample size
is important because prior awards are subject to judgment variability: if
a court selects only a single case for comparison, then, even if the court
is extremely confident that the prior case is indeed comparable, it would
remain unclear whether the award in that case is due to the specific facts
of the case or to randomness. A court may be justified in sacrificing
some degree of “comparability” for purposes of increasing the sample
size. Of course, in practice, a court may determine that the material
facts of a case are too unique for comparison, and may accordingly
forego any application of CCG.
With these factors in mind, the court should arrive at a process for
selecting a suitable set of prior cases. Selection methods should remain
flexible so that courts may cater such methods to the unique
circumstances of the case at hand. Initially, courts can obtain guidance
from comparative approaches used regularly to determine damages in
other civil contexts. 75
Thus, consider a simple procedure in which the court asks each party
to identify a set of comparable cases. Such a procedure is likely to
result in a set of extreme cases, since each party selects cases to

72. Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2001).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See infra Part VI. Courts may also obtain guidance from the class action context, where
courts sometimes select a set of “representative” or “bellwether” cases for settlement or litigation
purposes. See generally Bavli, supra note 50.
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maximize its own interests. 76 On the other hand, a method by which the
court, rather than the parties, selects a set of comparable cases is likely
to produce less variability, but is susceptible to a number of drawbacks,
including the potential for judicial bias and undue burden on the court.
Alternatively, the court may direct the parties to agree on a set of prior
cases; but this may be difficult and inefficient without additional
structure from the court. 77
Although the circumstances of a particular case may call for one of
the methods above, a particularly useful approach is one in which the
court selects a final set of cases from a pool identified by the litigants
and the court. Variations of this method have been used in various civil
contexts. 78 It allows for significant flexibility, and benefits from both a
litigant-based selection process and the relative objectivity of the judge.
Finally, it is possible to include (implicitly) the trier of fact in the
selection process by providing it with qualitative information regarding
the set of comparable cases, thus allowing it to weight the prior-award
information based, in part, on its assessment regarding the alignment of
the prior cases. I discuss this possibility further in the following section.
B. Distilling Comparable-Case Information
Once the court has selected a suitable set of prior cases, it must decide
what information should be considered by the trier of fact as guidance.
A study by Professor Michael Saks et al. examined the effects of various
forms of jury guidance on amounts awarded for pain and suffering in
personal injury cases. 79 They found that, while damage caps performed
poorly in terms of variability and distortion of award magnitude, various
forms of distributional information—in particular, an “award interval,”
an “award average-plus-interval,” and “award examples”—were
effective in reducing variability while distorting award magnitude
minimally or not at all. 80 These results support the model described in
Part IV. In particular, in line with the analysis above, prior-award
information is expected to cause a reduction in variability and minimal
(if any) distortion of award magnitude where the distribution of priorawards is similar to the distribution of awards that would be obtained in
76. See generally Loren H. Brown et al., Bellwether Trial Selection in Multi-District Litigation:
Empirical Evidence in Favor of Random Selection, 47 AKRON L. REV. 663, 674–75 (2014).
77. See generally id. at 675.
78. See infra Part VI; see also Brown et al., supra note 76, at 672–76 (describing cases
employing such procedures in the bellwether context). See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for
“Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571 (2012).
79. See Saks et al., supra note 15.
80. See id. at 249–55. Saks et al. observed mixed results for an “award average” form. See id. at
253–55.
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the absence of prior-award information. Indeed, Saks et al. obtained the
values of the guidance provided to survey participants from the results
of their pilot study. Specifically, they used the median of the pilot study
for the award average, the 10th and 90th percentiles for the award
interval, the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for the award average-plusinterval, and the 10th, 35th, 65th, and 90th percentiles for the award
examples. 81
The discussion in Part IV suggests that courts should choose
information forms that provide jurors with information regarding the
“center” as well as the “spread,” or variability, of the distribution of
prior awards. 82 The award interval, award average-plus-interval, and
award examples have the advantage, relative to providing, for example,
only the award average, that jurors are provided information regarding
the variability of the prior awards. This enables them to weight the
prior-award information appropriately. The award examples form is
particularly appealing, because it provides jurors with the most
information, relative to the other information forms, regarding prioraward variability.
Further, in addition to numerical prior-award information, it may be
beneficial for the court to allow the trier of fact to hear qualitative
summary information regarding the prior cases. Providing the trier of
fact with such information would strengthen its role in the possibly factintensive identification process, and would mitigate the effects of
potential bias from misalignment. As suggested above, providing the
trier of fact with qualitative case information implicitly includes it in the
case-selection process by enabling it to weight the prior-award
information based, in part, on its assessment of the comparability of the
prior cases. 83
If the court allows the trier of fact to hear qualitative case
information, it must determine an appropriate form for such
information—for example, a brief description regarding the set of cases
as a whole, or a set of short factual summaries regarding each individual
case.
As described in Part VI below, there is substantial precedent for
allowing a jury to hear comparable-case information in the form of
81. Id. at 248. The authors’ results for the cap condition, which caused a distortion in the size, or
magnitude, of the award and mixed effects on variability (depending on the severity category) can be
interpreted as supportive of the model herein, but may also have implications for the effects of prioraward information.
82. It is possible that, empirically, jurors will not in fact weight the prior-award information
according to the relative variability of such information; but without significant evidence to the contrary,
courts should arguably provide jurors with relevant variability information.
83. The court should balance the benefits of allowing qualitative case information with the costs
(including attorneys’ fees, delays, etc.) of allowing such information.
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evidence introduced as expert testimony. A jury may thereby “consider
. . . arguments about the effect of [purported differences] on the validity
of [the] comparison and . . . adjust its damage award accordingly.” 84
VI. CONCLUSION
In the previous parts, I addressed three major objections to CCG
methods. First, I explained that CCG can reduce unpredictability and
improve the accuracy of awards—notwithstanding the judgment
variability associated with the prior awards—by allowing for the sharing
of information across cases. Second, I discussed how information
regarding awards in comparable cases can be understood not as an
alternative to assessing damages for pain and suffering or an appropriate
punitive damages award, but as fundamental to assessing such values.
Finally, I explained that it is not necessary for the prior cases to be
perfectly comparable to the subject case, and that, assuming a
reasonable method for identifying comparable cases, it is unlikely—
particularly for awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages—
that they will diminish, rather than improve, accuracy.
Moreover, it is important to understand that using comparable-case
information as guidance in determining awards for pain and suffering
and punitive damages is not a remote concept that requires dramatic
change to current practices. Indeed, courts have recognized the
importance of comparable-case information as guidance in determining
damage awards in a range of contexts.
First, there is substantial precedent from the judicial-review context
for allowing information regarding prior awards to influence present
awards and, in particular, for the use of comparable-case information as
guidance in determining an appropriate award or range of awards.
Indeed, courts have described the comparison of awards to prior awards
for similar injuries as “[a] mainstay of the excessiveness determination,”
noting that “[t]his use of comparison is a recognition that the evaluation
of emotional damages is not readily susceptible to ‘rational analysis.’” 85
For example, courts in New York have held that, in determining whether
an award is excessive, “[a] reviewing court must consider awards in
comparable cases” 86—that the “determination of whether a
compensatory damages award is excessive should not be conducted in a
vacuum, but instead should include consideration of the amounts

84. Syufy Enters. v. Am. Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir. 1986).
85. Salinas v. O’Neill, 286 F.3d 827, 830–31 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
86. Alla v. Verkay, 979 F. Supp. 2d 349, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (emphasis added).
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awarded in other, comparable cases.” 87 The U.S. Supreme Court has
itself indicated, in the context of determining whether a particular
punitive damages award exceeded the amount permitted by the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution, that “[c]omparing the punitive
damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed
for comparable misconduct provides a[n] . . . indicium of
excessiveness.” 88
Second, there is substantial precedent from the bench-trial context for
CCG—and specifically, for consideration of comparable-case
information by the trier of fact for guidance in determining awards for
pain and suffering and punitive damages. In fact, consideration of
comparable-case information is often expected. For example, in JutziJohnson, Judge Posner remarked that most courts “treat the
determination of how much damages for pain and suffering to award as
a standardless, unguided exercise of discretion by the trier of fact,
reviewable for abuse of discretion pursuant to no standard to guide the
reviewing court either.” 89 He advised:
To minimize the arbitrary variance in awards bound to result from
such a throw-up-the-hands approach, the trier of fact should . . . be
informed of the amounts of pain and suffering damages awarded in
similar cases. And when the trier of fact is a judge, he should be
required as part of his Rule 52(a) obligation to set forth in his
opinion the damages awards that he considered comparable. We
make such comparisons routinely in reviewing pain and suffering
awards, as do other courts. It would be a wise practice to follow at

87. DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 183 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see Geressy v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“CPLR 5501(c)’s
conception of reasonable compensation cannot exist in a vacuum. There needs to be some point of
reference. With economic damages, the court may rely on traditional methods of economic analysis.
As for the non-economic pain and suffering award, the reviewing court must begin by identifying some
group of similar cases to serve as a referent. This task is difficult, particularly in cases exploring
relatively new types of injuries and claims such as those in the instant case involving [repetitive stress
injury (RSI)] claims against a keyboard manufacturer. Cases with similar causal agents, similarlynamed diagnoses, or similar reductions in quality of life might serve as benchmarks.”), aff’d in part sub
nom. Madden v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 152 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1998).
88. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996); see also Degorski v. Wilson,
No. 04 CV 3367, 2014 WL 3511220, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2014) (“In assessing whether a punitive
damage award is constitutionally appropriate, the Supreme Court has directed courts to focus their
evaluation on three guideposts: (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the relationship
between the amount of the punitive damages awarded and the harm or potential harm suffered by the
Plaintiff; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages award and the civil penalties authorized
or imposed in comparable cases.”).
89. Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001).
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the trial level as well. 90
Third, there is precedent from various civil contexts for asking jurors
to make comparisons for purposes of determining damages. The
comparisons often relate to goods or services for which there is an
economic market, and the comparisons are undertaken for purposes of
providing information regarding the market, which, in turn, provides
information regarding the appropriate damages award.
For example, in the context of determining “just compensation” in
eminent domain litigation, it is common for a court to ask the jury to
undertake a “comparable sales” analysis, for which the jury hears
testimony regarding the selling prices of comparable properties. 91 In
such cases, the court intends to provide the jury with information
regarding the market to which the property at issue belongs, and thereby
facilitate the jury’s assessment of just compensation and thus an
appropriate compensatory damages award. Indeed, comparable sales
evidence is often viewed as the “best evidence” of market value.92
Similarly, damage awards for breaches of contract for the sale of goods
or services are often computed by looking at the market price of
comparable goods or services. 93 And courts also rely on the jury to

90. Id.; see also Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that
the lower court “should have considered awards in similar cases, both in Illinois and elsewhere,” and
that “[c]ourts may be able to derive guidance for calculating damages for loss of consortium from the
approach that the Supreme Court has taken in recent years to the related question of assessing the
constitutionality of punitive damages”); Zurba v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 2d 951, 961 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (considering awards in “comparable” cases), aff’d, 318 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2003); Elk v. United
States, 87 Fed. Cl. 70, 97 (2009) (“Various cases, including those arising under the FTCA, suggest that
judges faced with the prospect of determining pain and suffering awards should look to the awards in
similar cases.”); Cochran v. A/H Battery Assocs. and Arcorp Props., 909 F. Supp. 911, 917 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (“[C]ourts have long reviewed damage awards in other similar cases to determine the scope of
reasonableness in a particular case.”).
91. See United States v. 1,129.75 Acres of Land, 473 F.2d 996, 998 (8th Cir. 1973) (citing cases,
and holding that, “[g]enerally, evidence of sales of comparable property is persuasive evidence of
market value, either as direct proof or in support of a witness’s opinion”).
92. See United States v. 24.48 Acres of Land, 812 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing United
States v. 8.41 Acres, 680 F.2d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 1982)) (“First, we reiterate the principle that the best
evidence of market value is comparable sales.”); see also John J. Dvorske & Ann K. Wooster,
Condemnation of Property, Comparable Sales, Generally, in 7 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER’S
EDITION § 14:90 (Dec. 2015).
93. See U.C.C. § 2-713 (AM. LAW INSTIT. 2014) (“[T]he measure of damages for non-delivery or
repudiation by the seller [of goods] is the difference between the market price at the time when the
buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential
damages provided in th[e] Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the
seller’s breach.”); see also Gulf Power Co. v. Coalsales II, LLC, 522 F. App’x. 699, 707 (11th Cir.
2013) (holding, in a case involving a breach of a contract for the purchase and sale of coal, that “the
appropriate measure of damages would be the market remedy provided for in § 672.713 [of the U.C.C.],
in which damages are calculated by comparing the contract price to the fair market value of comparable
goods on the open market”).
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make comparisons in arriving at damages calculations in the antitrust
context. 94
A detailed examination of the legal foundations of CCG is beyond the
scope of this article. The legal context above is intended simply to show
that there is a long history, across various contexts, of using
comparable-case information as guidance in determining damages.
Indeed, courts have applied such methods notwithstanding the
objections addressed in this article. For example, consider the objection
that courts will compound the arbitrariness of awards by obtaining
guidance from prior awards that presumably suffer from the same
arbitrariness that courts hope to address. This objection applies
similarly to comparable-case information considered in the bench-trial
context, but bench-trial judges nevertheless consider comparable-case
information. Additionally, the objection that methods involving the use
of prior awards “fail to address the fundamental issue of how one should
initially assess the value of pain-and-suffering damages” 95 or arrive at
an appropriate punitive damages award applies similarly to the use of
comparable-case information in the judicial-review and bench-trial
contexts; but such information is still used in these contexts. Finally, the
objection that the validity of methods involving comparable-case
information relies heavily on the presumption that the prior cases
identified are indeed materially comparable to the present case applies
similarly to all of the contexts discussed above; 96 but such methods are
nevertheless used.
My aim in this article was to address the major objections to CCG
methods by explaining simply, but formally, what many courts and
commentators have recognized implicitly: that CCG is effective in
reducing unpredictability and improving the accuracy of awards for pain
and suffering and punitive damages by allowing for the sharing of
information across cases.

94. For example, in Syufy Enters. v. Am. Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1986),
counterclaimant AMC based its damages calculation on comparisons with purportedly comparable
markets. It presented such comparisons to the jury, which ultimately rendered an award accordingly.
See id. at 1002–03. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that damages may not be computed based
on comparable markets. See id. The court then rejected the argument that the comparison markets were
not comparable to the market at issue and thereby inappropriately inflating AMC’s damages calculation.
See id. at 1003. The court held that “[c]omparability is a question of fact” and that “[i]t was for the jury
to consider [the opposing party’s] arguments about the effect of the [claimed differences] on the validity
of comparison and to adjust its damage award accordingly. There was sufficient evidence to allow a
jury to render a damage award for AMC on the basis of the comparison . . . .” Id.
95. Avraham, supra note 19, at 104.
96. The objection applies directly to the judicial-review and bench-trial contexts and analogously
to the market-comparisons context.
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